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Commentary
By Wayne Forrest
I can understand Indonesia's dilemma in reacting to the September 11 terrorist attacks on the US: its never been easy for Indonesia to publicly take sides in a conflict.
On July 23rd Megawati Sukarnoputri emerged from a six month process to remove her reform partner, Abdurrahman Wahid, to become Indonesia's 5th President. Supported by a coalition that included those from Islamic parties that opposed her for President in 1999 on the grounds that she was a woman, Megawati appointed one of the most competent economic teams possible. Led by former Ambassador to the United States, Dr. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti, they seemed primed to role up their sleeves and fix an ailing economy saddled with burdensome debt, looming budget deficits, slowed trade and investment, and confusing attitudes about divestment and privatization. The attacks of September 11 threw much of this off track as Megawati's government became a player on the world stage. Whether or not she was willing or capable of sustaining a major role in the anti-terrorism coalition mobilized by the US, Indonesia has been thrust into this position, sealed by President Megawati's meeting with President Bush on September 18 in Washington. When Allied forces attacked Afghanistan, Indonesia was asked to do something it has been loathe to do in its brief history: take sides. Indonesia's active non-aligned foreign policy, seemingly resigned to the dust bin in the wake of the Soviet Union's and Communism's demise, was resurrected. Indonesia, home to 10% of the world's Muslims -many poor and susceptible to conspiracy theories--will want to have it both ways: with Muslims, against terrorism.
In typical fashion, Indonesia's initial reactions to the 9/11 attacks sent mixed messages to her overseas friends, many of whom expressed dismay that while on one hand President Megawati could strongly condemn the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and on the other her Vice President, Hamzah Haz, and other intellectuals could imply that America was atoning for its past sins against
Muslims, implying that its strong support for Israel was wrong . It didn't help that small but virulent anti-American street protests were organized in Jakarta and other towns and that the personal safety of Americans and their businesses were threatened by young radical leaders of Muslim groups who in normal times would hardly get press attention at all. Off balance, Megawati and her Cabinet took time to regroup but ultimately came out where most observers suspected they would: against the terrorism, against the radicals calling for cessation of diplomatic relations, but against the bombing of Muslim civilians. Perhaps, following her lead, other groups besides the radicals took to the streets and organized peaceful protests against the war and in some cases against those groups calling for the expulsion of Americans.
More of a balanced picture came through although you wouldn't know it watching
CNN.
All this has reinforced the perceptual confusions that often exist between Indonesia and the United States, pushing apart the convergence of mutual interests (economic, political, (Continued on page 3)
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