Events

Notes on Political and Security Briefing With Dr. Harold Crouch

 AICC met with veteran Indonesia analyst Dr. Harold Crouch* on Wednesday, November 28^th.   An Australian possessing a natural sympathy for the enormous problems facing Indonesia , Crouch focused on Islam, the role of the military, security, and the weakness of State institutions. The background counterpoint to these themes was his observation that international media portraits of Indonesia were often black and white when in fact they should be grey.   He takes a nuanced approach to Indonesia problems urging us to adequately understand them before condemning the nation’s leaders.

 Dr. Crouch led off by saying that expectations for change in Indonesia following the resignation of President Suharto in 1998 were probably too high. Although his successor, President Habibie, initiated several meaningful democratic changes (full press freedom, open party politics) he was tied too much to the earlier regime.  President Wahid’s Presidency was virtually wounded from the start. Current expectations of his successor, President Megawati Soekarnoputri are now quite low.

 The following are key points he made during the meeting:

 President Megawati and her government

	Megawati is not a strong source of vision for the nation or her government’s policy.  However, she is a shrewd and careful politician, a balancer of forces.
	Senior government ministers would like to prosecute more corruptors but can’t control a justice system, itself hampered by corruption.  To act otherwise would just be a reassertion of the authoritarianism of the past.
	Placing the blame for reform failures on “systems” (legislature, judicial) rather than “individuals” (ministers, political leaders), Crouch said senior ministers do have an urgency to carry out change but are up against intractable obstacles and don’t have sufficient authority to overcome them.

 Reaction to the 9/11 Attacks and the US response

	The Indonesian people have long suffered from acts of terrorism during the colonial period and after and thus have a muted response to the 9/11 attacks. Within this context Crouch does not see a contradiction when Indonesia states its readiness to fight terrorism while opposing the use of force in Afghanistan .
	He hasn’t seen much Indonesian press coverage of bin Laden’s world domination strategy and how this influenced the US reaction.
	If UN peacekeeping troops are eventually deployed in Afghanistan Indonesia would contribute soldiers to it. This would be a solution to the anti-American attitudes active in the country and provide a face saving way for the government to support the international coalition against terrorism. Indonesia can get behind something organized but the UN but not something organized by the US .

 Rise of Islam and Influence of Al-Quaida

	The idea of a “resurgence” of political Islam in Indonesia doesn’t quite make sense to Crouch.  In his opinion, political Islam has always been an important but not dominant factor in the nation’s history.  In 1955, during the first free and open national election,  Masyumi (the party with a clearly Islamic agenda) received only 20% of the votes.  In 1999, during the second free national election, a group of exclusively Islamic parties won only 18% ( his approximation) of the vote.  To say political Islam is a threat belies electoral history. Basically secular-minded parties win the majority of votes.
	The influence of Al-Quaida is hard for him to judge since secrecy is the nature of their operations.  On the other hand, from his interactions with the most vocal and active Islamic groups in the country he doesn’t detect an influence.  He characterized one that has been actively demonstrating, The Islamic Defender’s Front, as being quite disorganized and ill-funded.  Their demonstrations have rarely reached 1,000 (in a city of 10 million) and were mostly unemployed youth who could be paid a pittance to show up.  Another, Laskar Jihad, is better organized but is ideologically opposed to bin Laden.  Its leaders want Indonesia to be more like Saudi Arabia .   Laskar Jihad entered the Moluccan (centered in Ambon island) ethnic/religious conflict late but has provided several thousand armed Muslim volunteers to fight alongside local Ambonese Muslims.  Their natural sources for weapons are Muslim members of the Indonesia military, TNI.  Although TNI may not as a whole support Laskar Jihad, Crouch says that individual Muslim soldiers or units actively collaborate with them.
	The so-called rise of Islam shouldn’t be the reason for companies not to invest.  More general questions of instability and economic conditions should be the pertinent factors.

 Security Situation and Role of the Military

	Less than 5% of the country’s population is an area suffering from a “conflict”.
	Indonesia needs to revamp the structure of its military/police if it is to solve regional and separatist conflicts.   Problems of poor pay and divided loyalties need to be solved. It is difficult to expect local troops to act in a disciplined manner in approaching internal security when they have to support themselves and their families financially or can easily drawn to one side or another in a conflict.  Crouch recommends that a new multiethnic and religious battalion be drawn up that is well paid and properly trained to quickly intercede in hot spots.
	Regional autonomy has not yet led to local “warlords” and he doubts it would.
	Security for foreigners is not a problem.  Even with all the threats of “sweepings” there has not been one death of a foreigner related to these incidents.